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NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS v. SEBELIUS: 
THE MISGUIDED APPLICATION AND PERPETUATION OF AN 
AMORPHOUS COERCION THEORY 
MEGAN IX∗ 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (National 
Federation),1 the Supreme Court of the United States examined five is-
sues that arose from challenges to the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act.2  The Court held that the individual mandate was a val-
id exercise of Congress’s taxing powers but also concluded that the 
Medicaid expansion provision of the Act, which penalized non-
participating states by eliminating their existing funding, was coercive 
and exceeded Congress’s powers under the Spending Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.3  In finding the Medicaid expansion penalty provi-
sion unconstitutional, the Court abandoned the deference that had 
long been afforded to Congress in exercising its spending powers.4  
Moreover, the Court applied an amorphous coercion theory and left 
little guidance for evaluating coercion claims in the future.5  Instead, 
the Court should have found that states had a real choice in whether 
to participate in the Medicaid expansion, and that where states have a 
real choice, there cannot be coercion.6 
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 1.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 2.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S. Code); see also infra Part I. 
 3.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also infra Part III. 
 4.  See infra Part II. 
 5.  See infra Part IV. 
 6.  See infra Part IV. 
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I.  THE CASE 
In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”)7 to increase the number of Americans covered by 
health insurance and to decrease the cost of health care.8  While the 
ACA is comprised of ten titles that contain hundreds of provisions, 
the two key provisions that were directly challenged in court were the 
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion.9 
The individual mandate seeks to reduce the number of unin-
sured U.S. residents as part of a broader set of regulations directed at 
reforming the health care system.10  It requires most Americans to 
maintain “minimum essential” health insurance coverage.11  Starting 
in 2014, those who do not comply with the individual mandate must 
make a “shared responsibility payment” to the federal government.12  
The ACA describes the shared responsibility payment as a penalty that 
would be paid to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) with an indi-
vidual’s taxes, and would be assessed and collected in the same man-
ner as tax penalties.13 
The Medicaid expansion increases the number of individuals 
states must cover.14  The ACA requires state programs to provide Med-
icaid coverage to adults with incomes up to 133% of the federal pov-
erty level.15  The ACA increases federal funding to cover the expenses 
                                                        
 7.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012) (citing Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code)).  
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id.  
 10.  Id. at 2613.   
 11.  Id. at 2580 (citing I.R.C. § 5000A (2010)).  The mandate contains exceptions for 
certain individuals, such as prisoners, undocumented aliens, and people with incomes be-
low a specified level.  Id.  Individuals who are not exempt and do not receive insurance 
through their employers or government programs are required to purchase private insur-
ance.  Id.  Plans and programs that qualify as minimum essential coverage are delineated 
in I.R.C. § 5000A(f) (2010). 
 12.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2580 (citing I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1)).  The 
payment is calculated as a percentage of household income subject to a floor based on a 
specified dollar amount and a ceiling based on the average annual premium the individual 
would have to pay for qualifying private health insurance.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 2571.  The ACA bars the IRS from using several of its normal enforcement 
tools, such as criminal prosecutions and levies.  Id. at 2580. 
 14.  Id. at 2581.  The Medicaid program was enacted in 1965 and provides federal 
funding to states to assist pregnant women, children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, 
and the disabled in obtaining medical care.  Id.  To receive Medicaid funding, states must 
comply with certain federal criteria about who receives care and what services are provid-
ed.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2006)).  
 15.  Id. at 2582.  Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that helps with medical 
costs for some people with limited resources and income.  Medicaid, MEDICARE.GOV, 
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of expanding Medicaid, though states will eventually bear a portion of 
the costs.16  Under the ACA, if a state does not comply with the new 
coverage requirements, it may lose all of its federal Medicaid funds.17 
President Barack Obama signed the ACA on March 23, 2010.18  
Shortly after, twenty-six states,19 several private individuals, and the 
National Federation of Independent Business brought an action in 
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida 
against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), 
the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“DOT”), the U.S. Department 
of Labor (“DOL”), and their respective secretaries (collectively “the 
government”).20  The plaintiffs challenged the individual mandate 
and Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA, arguing that the indi-
vidual mandate violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,21 
and that the expansion of Medicaid violated the Spending Clause.22  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the govern-
ment on the plaintiffs’ Medicaid expansion claim.23  The district court 
found that the Medicaid expansion did not violate the Spending 
                                                        
http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/help-paying-costs/medicaid/medicaid. 
html (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).  Each state may have its own qualification criteria in addi-
tion to the federal requirements.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2582. 
 16.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1)).  The 
ACA provides that the federal government will pay 100 percent of the costs of covering 
these newly eligible individuals through 2016.  Id.  After 2016, the federal payment level 
gradually decreases to a minimum of ninety percent.  Id.  
 17.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c), invalidated by Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012)). 
 18.  Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a 
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/ 
health/policy/24health.html?_r=0. 
 19.  The twenty-six states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washing-
ton, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263 n.1 (N.D. Fla.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Florida 
ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012). 
 20.  Id. at 1263. 
 21.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 22.  Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1265. 
 23.  Id. at 1270.  The district court reasoned that the Medicaid program has always 
been voluntary and thus states could not be coerced into participating.  Id. at 1267.  
“When the freedom to ‘opt out’ of the program is viewed in light of the fact that Congress 
has expressly reserved the right to alter or amend the Medicaid program . . . and has done 
so many times over the years, . . . the plaintiffs’ argument was not strong.”  Id. at 1268 (cita-
tion omitted).  The court found that there was very little support for the coercion argu-
ment “as every single federal Court of Appeals called upon to consider the issue has reject-
ed the coercion theory as a viable claim.”  Id. 
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Clause, and that a spending condition cannot be coercive and violate 
the Tenth Amendment.24  Further, the district court held that Con-
gress did not have the constitutional power to enact the individual 
mandate, and that the mandate could not be severed from the rest of 
the ACA.25  Ultimately, the district court struck down the ACA in its 
entirety.26 
The government appealed the district court’s ruling, and the 
plaintiffs cross-appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling 
on their Medicaid expansion claim.27  The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding 
that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause.28  The government, however, argued in the alter-
native that the individual mandate was enacted validly as a tax under 
the Spending Clause.29  The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, concluding 
that the individual mandate did not impose a tax and could not be 
authorized by Congress’s power to “Lay and collect Taxes.”30  Unlike 
the district court, however, the Eleventh Circuit held that the individ-
ual mandate was severable from the rest of the ACA, and it left the 
remaining provisions intact.31  With respect to the Medicaid expan-
sion claim, the Eleventh Circuit unanimously held that the expansion 
of Medicaid was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause.32  The Eleventh Circuit further held that the Medi-
caid expansion did not coerce states into compliance and thus did not 
                                                        
 24.  Id. at 1266.  
 25.  Id. at 1305.  The district court reasoned that the individual mandate was unconsti-
tutional because the failure to purchase health insurance is “inactivity” and that the Com-
merce Clause can only reach individuals and entities engaged in an “activity.”  Id. at 1270.  
 26.  Id. at 1305–06.   
 27.  See Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (appealing the district court’s decision in Bondi). 
 28.  Id. at 1282, 1311.   
 29.  Id. at 1313. 
 30.  Id. at 1313–14 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 31.  Id. at 1327–28.  Other federal courts of appeals also heard challenges to the indi-
vidual mandate.  See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); 
Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 
391 (4th Cir. 2011).  The courts of appeals upheld the mandate as a valid exercise of Con-
gress’s commerce power.  Thomas More Law Ctr., 651 F.3d at 534; Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 4–5.  
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the individual mandate’s penalty is a tax within the 
meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act and therefore that the individual mandate could not 
be challenged until after the penalty had been paid.  Liberty Univ., Inc., 671 F.3d at 397–98.  
 32.  Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1262. 
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violate the Tenth Amendment33  The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to review the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit with regard to the 
individual mandate and Medicaid expansion.34  Additionally, the 
Court determined that there were two other arguments that warrant-
ed evaluation that had not been asserted by either party.  Thus, the 
Court appointed amicus curiae to argue that: (1) the Anti-Injunction 
Act, which prohibits suits involving the collection of taxes from being 
heard before the tax is assessed, prevented the challenges to the indi-
vidual mandate from being heard; and (2) the individual mandate 
could be severed from the Act.35 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress’s power un-
der the Spending Clause to condition the receipt of federal funds by 
the states.36  The power to encourage states to take specific actions is 
limited by certain criteria.37  In addition to the defined criteria, the 
Supreme Court has also recognized the coercion theory as a limit to 
Congress’s spending power.38  The coercion theory has been dis-
cussed twice in the Supreme Court related to spending power cases.39  
In each case, the Court recognized a possibility that Congress might 
one day cross a line where states no longer have an actual choice but 
to participate in a particular program.40  There is limited case law that 
                                                        
 33.  Id. at 1267.  The Eleventh Circuit noted, “[i]f anything can be said of the coercion 
doctrine in the Spending Clause context, however, it is that it is an amorphous one, honest 
in theory but complicated in application.”  Id. at 1266.  The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that 
the Medicaid expansion was not unduly coercive for four reasons.  Id. at 1267–68.  First, 
the states had warning that Congress could amend or alter the program; second, the fed-
eral government would cover almost all of the costs associated with the expansion; third, 
states had plenty of notice about the changes; and lastly, states have the choice to not par-
ticipate in the program.  Id.  Further, the court noted that the Medicaid Act gives HHS the 
discretion to withhold all or merely a portion of funding from a noncompliant state, not 
guaranteeing that a state would lose all of its funding.  Id. at 1268.  
 34.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2582 (2012).   
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992) (noting the Supreme 
Court’s broad construction of Congress’s power under the Spending Clause); see infra Part 
II.A. 
 37.  See infra Part II.A.2.  
 38.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 39.  See infra Part II.A.1–2.  
 40.  See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (indicating that there are 
circumstances that would prohibit Congress from offering financial inducements that 
would convert “pressure” to “compulsion”).  The Court did not discuss what circumstances 
might cause legislation to be coercive; rather, it noted that the spending power is not un-
limited and in the future there may be situations that require looking at coercion.  Id.  
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has applied the coercion doctrine.  Prior to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in National Federation, the Supreme Court had never ruled that 
the terms of any grant program crossed the line between encourage-
ment and coercion.41  Other federal courts have recognized the exist-
ence of the coercion theory, but have interpreted it and applied it in 
different ways.42 
Part II.A discusses the Spending Clause and the criteria estab-
lished to evaluate the use of Congress’s spending powers.  It also dis-
cusses the limited development and application of the coercion theo-
ry in the Supreme Court.  Part II.B discusses the inconsistent 
interpretation and application of the coercion theory by federal ap-
pellate courts.  First, it examines federal appellate courts that avoided 
applying the coercion theory after it was introduced in Steward Ma-
chine Company v. Davis.43  Second, it examines federal appellate courts 
that hesitated to recognize the coercion theory as valid and were re-
luctant to find coercion after South Dakota v. Dole,44 even when an in-
creasing amount of federal funds were at stake.45  Finally, it examines 
the reluctance of federal appellate courts to apply the coercion theory 
in instances where a state could lose all or part of its Medicaid funds.46 
A.  The Spending Clause Criteria and the Supreme Court’s Limited 
Development of the Coercion Theory 
Congress’s power under the Spending Clause enables it to en-
courage states to take certain actions that it could not otherwise re-
quire them to take.47  Thus, the Spending Clause allows Congress 
some influence over states’ policy choices.48  The power to encourage 
states to take certain actions is not unlimited; the Supreme Court has 
previously established four criteria that must be satisfied to trigger ju-
dicial deference to Congress’s use of conditional grants.49  In addition 
to the four criteria, the Supreme Court has at times recognized the 
coercion theory as an additional consideration for spending power 
limitations.50  The theory is that the proposed legislation cannot be so 
                                                        
 41.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2634.   
 42.  See infra Part II.B.  
 43.  301 U.S. 548 (1937); see infra Part II.B.1. 
 44.  483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 45.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 46.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
 47.  College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
668 (1999). 
 48.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012). 
 49.  See infra text accompanying notes 60–64.  
 50.  See infra Parts II.A.1–2. 
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coercive as to force the participation of the states in a federal pro-
gram.51  The Court has never developed a test to apply the theory.52 
1.  Introduction of the Coercion Theory: Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis 
In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,53 a corporation challenged the 
imposition of an employment tax under the newly enacted Social Se-
curity Act (“SSA”).54  The corporation argued that the SSA improperly 
coerced states into participation in an unemployment compensation 
fund, violating the Tenth Amendment.55  The Court held that the 
statute was within the spending powers of Congress.56  The Court fur-
ther held that the statute did not improperly coerce states into partic-
ipation, distinguishing temptation and coercion: 
But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coer-
cion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties. . . .  Nothing 
in the case suggests the exertion of a power akin to undue 
influence, if we assume that such a concept can ever be ap-
plied with fitness to the relations between state and nation.  
Even on that assumption the location of the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be induce-
ment, would be a question of degree,—at times, perhaps, of 
fact.57 
                                                        
 51.  The Supreme Court has recognized that “in some circumstances the financial in-
ducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure 
turns into compulsion.’”  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589 (1937)). 
 52.  See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (“The limited case law on the doctrine of coercion and 
the fact that the Supreme Court has never devised a test to apply it has left many circuits 
with the conclusion that the doctrine, twice recognized by the Supreme Court, is not a via-
ble defense to Spending Clause legislation.”).  
 53.  301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
 54.  Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397mm 
(2006)); Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 578. 
 55.  Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 585.  The SSA established a federal payroll tax on 
employers but allowed employers to pay taxes to a state unemployment compensation 
fund and then credit those payments toward the federal tax.  Id. at 574–76.   
 56.  Id. at 585.  In finding it a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power, the Court 
reasoned that the SSA was enacted for the general welfare of the people, given the perva-
sive unemployment problems across the country.  Id. at 586–87.  
 57.  Id. at 589–90.  
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The Court declined to “fix the outermost line” at which induce-
ment or persuasion goes beyond the bounds of power: “[F]or present 
purposes . . . wherever the line may be, this statute is within it.”58 
2.  Development of Spending Clause Criteria: South Dakota v. Dole 
In South Dakota v. Dole,59 the State of South Dakota challenged 
Congress’s spending powers exercised by a federal highway funding 
program, and the Supreme Court established the criteria for Con-
gress’s use of the spending powers for federal funding programs.60  
South Dakota challenged a statute that directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds if 
states failed to maintain a minimum drinking-age requirement of 
twenty-one years.61  The Court held that the statute was a valid use of 
Congress’s spending power, and identified four criteria to evaluate 
proper use of the Spending Clause.62  First, the exercise of the spend-
ing power must be in pursuit of “the general welfare.”63  Second, the 
conditions placed on receipt of federal funds must be reasonably re-
lated to the legislation’s stated goal.64  Third, the intent to condition 
funds on a particular action must be unambiguous and must enable 
the states to exercise knowingly their choice to participate.65  Finally, 
the legislation cannot induce the states to engage in activities that 
would be unconstitutional.66 
The Court examined the claim that threatening to withhold 
highway funds coerced states into implementing the minimum drink-
ing-age requirement and found that the statute was not coercive.67  
The Court recognized that there might be circumstances where the 
financial inducement offered by Congress could be considered coer-
cive, but found that those circumstances were not present in South 
Dakota’s case.68  According to the Court, withholding five percent of 
federal funds for not complying with a legal drinking-age require-
ment amounted to a relatively mild encouragement, not coercion.69  
                                                        
 58.  Id. at 591.   
 59.  483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 60.  Id. at 203, 207. 
 61.  Id. at 203. 
 62.  Id. at 204, 207–08. 
 63.  Id. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 639 (1937)).  
 64.  Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 16 (1981)). 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 208. 
 67.  Id. at 211. 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. 
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The Court also noted that the ultimate success of a federal grant pro-
gram in reaching its objective was not an indication of coercion.70  
The Court found that South Dakota still had the choice to accept or 
reject the funding, and thus, according to the Court, the coercion ar-
gument was “more rhetoric than fact.”71  In sum, while the Court rec-
ognized the coercion theory discussed in Steward Machine Co., it de-
clined to find any coercion present because of the relatively small 
amount of money at stake and the ability of states to choose whether 
to accept federal funding.72 
B.  Inconsistent Interpretation and Application of Coercion Theory by 
Federal Appellate Courts 
The Supreme Court’s discussion of the coercion theory in Stew-
ard Machine Co. and Dole did not establish guidelines for applying a 
coercion test.73  As a result, some courts have made efforts to apply a 
coercion test, while others have been hesitant to recognize it as a valid 
theory.74  No other court has used the coercion theory to invalidate a 
federal spending program.75 
1.  Many Federal Appellate Courts Avoided Applying Coercion Theory 
After Steward Machine Co. v. Davis 
Following the decision in Steward Machine Co., many federal ap-
pellate courts avoided applying the coercion theory when considering 
whether to invalidate a federal spending program that imposed spe-
cific requirements upon the states.76  In New Hampshire Department of 
                                                        
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  The court did not discuss the point at which encouragement becomes coercion, or 
the circumstances of the legislation that should be examined.  See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Atty. 
Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) 
(noting that “the Supreme Court has never devised a test to apply [the doctrine of coer-
cion]”).  
 74.  See infra Parts II.B.1–2.  
 75.  Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1266. 
 76.  See, e.g., N.H. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1980) (decid-
ing whether to invalidate a federal spending program on other grounds); Oklahoma v. 
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same).  Other courts have similarly declined to 
recognize the presence of coercion.  See North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. 
Supp. 532, 535 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (“[W]henever the condition attached by Congress to an 
appropriation grant available to States relates to a ‘legitimately national’ purpose, in-
ducement or temptation to conform does not go beyond the bounds of the federal gov-
ernment’s legitimate spending power and is not coercion in any constitutional sense. . . .  
Moreover, the ‘coercive’ effect of a termination of federal assistance on the plaintiff North 
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Employment Security v. Marshall,77 for example, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit examined whether the New Hamp-
shire Unemployment Compensation Law failed to conform in six re-
spects with the requirements of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
(“FUTA”).78  The State of New Hampshire argued that the FUTA, 
which gave states the option to receive tax credits up to ninety per-
cent of the tax due if they conformed to federal law, itself was uncon-
stitutional.79   
New Hampshire argued that the ability of the state to refuse to 
participate in the program was illusory because the severe financial 
consequences that would follow such refusal would negate any real 
choice that the state might have.80  The First Circuit rejected this ar-
gument, noting, “[W]e do not agree that the carrot has become a 
club because rewards for conforming have increased.  It is not the size 
of the stakes that controls, but the rules of the game.”81  The court al-
so noted that the basic design and mechanism of the FUTA had not 
changed since 1935, even though the coverage had been extended.82 
A year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit heard an appeal from thirteen states challenging 
the constitutionality of a “pass-through” provision of the Supple-
mental Security Income Program of the Social Security Act (“SSI”).83  
In Oklahoma v. Schweiker,84 the states alleged that the “pass-through” 
provision was not a proper exercise of power under the Spending 
Clause, that it violated the Tenth Amendment, and that it was unduly 
coercive.85  The D.C. Circuit declined to analyze whether the provi-
sion was coercive but noted: 
                                                        
Carolina seems quite unreal.  The actual loss . . . would be less than fifty million dollars.”); 
see also Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 526 (1937) (“It is unnecessary to 
repeat now those considerations which have led to our decision in [Steward Machine Co.], 
that the Social Security Act has no such coercive effect.  As the Social Security Act is not 
coercive in its operation, the Unemployment Compensation Act cannot be set aside as an 
unconstitutional product of coercion.”).   
 77.  616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1980). 
 78.  Id. at 241.  
 79.  Id. at 241–43.  
 80.  Id. at 246.  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 401, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  Under the “pass-
through” provision, states are required to maintain certain levels of state payments to the 
SSI program as a condition of receiving federal Medicaid funds.  Id. at 404. 
 84.  655 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 85.  Id. at 403.  
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 The Supreme Court admonished in Steward Machine Co. 
that courts should attempt to avoid becoming entangled in 
ascertaining the point at which federal inducement to com-
ply with a condition becomes compulsion. . . . The courts are 
not suited to evaluating whether the states are faced here 
with an offer they cannot refuse or merely a hard choice. . . .  
We therefore follow the lead of other courts that have ex-
plicitly declined to enter this thicket when similar funding 
conditions have been at issue.86 
The D.C. Circuit held that the provision was a valid use of Con-
gress’s spending powers because it was reasonably related to the gen-
eral welfare.87  The Court further held that the provision did not vio-
late the Tenth Amendment because states could choose either to 
conform to the requirements or forgo federal funds.88 
2.  After Dole, Federal Appellate Courts Declined to Find Coercion in 
the Face of Increasing Amounts of Federal Funds at Stake, While 
Simultaneously Discounting the Coercion Theory 
In Dole, the Supreme Court did not place a limit on the percent-
age of funding that would amount to coercion and instead found that 
five percent was within the unspecified limit.89  It specified no bound-
aries for how much withheld funding might be coercive.  Thus, some 
circuit courts that attempted to follow Dole questioned the applicabil-
ity of the coercion theory and deferred to Congress’s power under the 
Spending Clause. 
For example, in Nevada v. Skinner,90 the State of Nevada relied on 
the Spending Clause to challenge the constitutionality of a national 
speed limit.91  The state alleged that the Emergency Highway Energy 
Conservation Act,92 which required states to post a maximum speed 
limit of fifty-five miles per hour on all highways as a precondition to 
receiving federal funds, left the state no real choice but to comply, vi-
olating the coercion limitation on Congress’s spending power.93  If 
Nevada refused to comply, it would lose ninety-five percent of its 
                                                        
 86.  Id. at 413–14.   
 87.  Id. at 411.  
 88.  Id. at 411–12.  
 89.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987). 
 90.  884 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 91.  Id. at 446. 
 92.  Pub. L. No. 93-239, 87 Stat. 1046 (1974).  
 93.  Skinner, 884 F.2d at 446.  
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highway funds.94  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit recognized the coercion theory, but noted that it was infre-
quently applied and never applied in favor of the challenging party.95  
Declining to engage in a detailed analysis, the court stated that “[t]he 
difficulty if not the impropriety of making judicial judgments regard-
ing a state’s financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly 
suspect as a method for resolving disputes between federal and state 
governments.”96  The Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the 
coercion theory was not important in the case because imposing a na-
tional speed limit would be a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, 
and thus the lesser restraint of losing federal funds for failure to 
comply with the highway safety statute was permissible.97 
Similarly, in Kansas v. United States,98 the state, relying on the co-
ercion theory, challenged conditions imposed under the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act99 
(“PRWORA”).100  Also known as “welfare reform,”101 PRWORA com-
prehensively changed to how states address low-income households,102 
requiring states to reach certain goals or adhere to certain guidelines 
before receiving federal funds.103  Kansas claimed that parts of the 
amended program requirements were too onerous and expensive, 
and because $130 million in federal funds were at stake, Kansas also 
argued that it was being coerced into implementing the program re-
quirements.104  In examining the coercion claim, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that “[t]he boundary 
between incentive and coercion has never been made clear, and 
courts have found no coercion in situations where similarly large 
amounts of federal money were at stake.”105  According to the Tenth 
                                                        
 94.  Id.  
 95.  Id. at 448. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 454. 
 98.  214 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 99.  Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended primarily in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 100.  Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1197–98.  
 101.  Id. at 1197. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  If a state wants a federal block grant for child support services, for example, 
PRWORA requires the state to enact laws for genetic testing to establish paternity, and laws 
that authorize “state child support agencies to take expedited enforcement action against 
non-paying noncustodial parents.”  Id. at 1198; see also 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5) & (c) (2006) 
(outlining certain requirements for federal funding). 
 104.  Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1198.  Specifically, Kansas asserted that the coercion violated 
the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 1202. 
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Circuit, “the coercion theory is unclear, suspect, and has little prece-
dent to support its application.”106  Ultimately, the court held that the 
requirements contained in parts of the PRWORA were not impermis-
sibly coercive.107 
The coercion theory appeared again in Jim C. v. United States,108 
where two parents sued the Arkansas Department of Education alleg-
ing violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,109 part of which 
prohibits any program or activity that receives federal funding from 
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability.110  The 
government argued that the waiver requirement of section 504 ex-
ceeded Congress’s spending power “by placing overly broad and . . . 
coercive conditions on federal funds.”111  The Eight Circuit noted that 
“[t]he sacrifice of all federal education funds, approximately $250 
million or 12 per cent. [sic] of the annual state education budget . . . 
would be politically painful, but [the court could not] say that it com-
pels Arkansas’s choice.”112  The Eight Circuit held that the waiver re-
quirement was a valid use of Congress’s spending powers and found 
no coercive interference because the state could avoid the require-
ments by declining federal education funds.113  Thus, despite the sub-
stantial amount of funding at stake, the Eighth Circuit followed the 
trend of other federal appellate courts and rejected the coercion 
claim. 
                                                        
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000).   
 109.  29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). 
 110.  Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1080.  The defendant moved to dismiss the case by asserting 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  Id.  The Eighth Circuit held that 
section 504 was a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power, and that Arkansas waived its 
immunity for section 504 suits by accepting federal funding.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 1081. 
 112.  Id. at 1082.   
 113.  Id.  In Pace v. Bogalusa City, 403 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered a similar challenge to the validity of a waiver of the state’s Eleventh Amendment im-
munity to section 504 claims.  The court declined to recognize coercion in the case, noting 
that a state can prevent suits by refusing the federal funds.  Id. at 287.  The court also rea-
soned that because states have the independent power to lay and collect taxes, they retain 
the ability to avoid the imposition of unwanted federal regulation simply by rejecting fed-
eral funds.  Id. at 278.  
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3.  Federal Appellate Courts Were Equally Reluctant to Apply the 
Coercion Theory in the Face of States Losing All or Part of 
Medicaid Funds 
Several cases have discussed the coercion theory in the context of 
a state at risk of losing all or part of its Medicaid funds.  In those cases, 
the state was often concerned with the dependence of its medical sys-
tem on federal funds.  Still, the courts remained unwilling to find co-
ercion present, relying on language from the HHS and the fact that 
states have a choice to accept or reject federal funds.114 
In West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,115 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to 
find coercion, even where a state’s Medicaid funding was at stake.116  
The State of West Virginia challenged the constitutionality of 
amendments to the Medicaid program that required the state to 
adopt a program to recover expenditures from estates of deceased 
Medicaid beneficiaries.117  West Virginia initially resisted implementa-
tion of the program and received notification from HHS that it could 
lose all or part of its funding for Medicaid.118  West Virginia filed suit 
against HHS, claiming that the estate recovery program provisions 
were unduly coercive.119  The state argued that the penalty of with-
holding all Medicaid funding was disproportionate compared to the 
money obtained from the estate recovery plan.120  The court noted 
that the Supreme Court had “provided little guidance for determin-
ing when the line between encouragement and coercion is crossed.”121  
                                                        
 114.  The Secretary of HHS is not required to withhold all funding for noncompliant 
states.  The Medicaid Act gives the Secretary the ability to impose a less drastic penalty, 
such as withholding funding from a specific part of the program.  West Virginia v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2002).  The Fourth Circuit 
also observed that “[i]f the conditions imposed on the federal grant are repugnant to the 
state, the state may decline to accept the funds.”  Id. at 296. 
 115.  289 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2002).   
 116.  Id. at 292. 
 117.  Id. at 283–84.  Before 1993, the Medicaid Act allowed states to recover medical 
costs paid by Medicaid from the beneficiary’s estate under certain circumstances.  Id. at 
284.  In 1993, Congress amended the Act to require states to recover certain Medicaid 
costs from the estates of certain deceased beneficiaries.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 285. 
 119.  Id. at 287.  Specifically, West Virginia argued that it had no choice but to comply 
with the estate recovery program because it was largely dependent on federal Medicaid 
dollars and without those dollars its health care system would effectively collapse.  Id.  
 120.  Id. at 285. 
 121.  Id. at 289.  The court also acknowledged that “the coercion theory is somewhat 
amorphous and cannot easily be reduced to a neat set of black-letter rules” and that the 
Supreme Court had not struck down an exercise of Congress’s spending powers.  Id. at 
288–89. 
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Nonetheless, because HHS had the option of withholding “all or part 
of” the funding, the Court held that the program was not unduly co-
ercive.122 
In another case in which a state challenged provisions that could 
put its Medicaid funding at risk, California brought suit against the 
United States for violating the Tenth Amendment by conditioning re-
ceipt of Medicaid funds on the agreement to provide emergency med-
ical services to illegal aliens.123  California argued that it had no choice 
but to agree to the new conditions to prevent a collapse of its medical 
system.124  The Ninth Circuit, returning to its reasoning in Skinner,125 
found that “to the extent that there is any viability left in the coercion 
theory, it is not reflected in the facts of this record.”126 
While a number of cases have commented on the coercion theo-
ry, its parameters have never been established.127  The Supreme Court 
has discussed but never expounded on the extent of the coercion 
theory, and no court has relied on the coercion theory to invalidate a 
federal spending program enacted by Congress.128 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In National Federation, the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the individual mandate but struck down the expansion of 
Medicare under the ACA.129  In so holding, the Court addressed five 
main issues.  First, the Court held that the penalty for not complying 
with the individual mandate does not have to be treated as a tax for 
purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.130  As a result, the suit was not 
barred and the Court moved on to examine the other challenges 
raised.131  Second, the Court held that the individual mandate ex-
ceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause.132  Third, the Court held that the ACA’s re-
                                                        
 122.  Id. at 291–92.  West Virginia received over $1 billion in Medicaid funds each year 
but recovered less than $2 million on the estate recovery program.  Id.  
 123.  California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1090–92 (9th Cir. 1997).  The other 
claims were related to the adverse impact on state and federal immigration policy.  Id. at 
1090–91. 
 124.  Id. at 1092. 
 125.  See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text. 
 126.  California, 104 F.3d at 1092. 
 127.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 128.  See supra notes 73, 75, and accompanying text.  
 129.  132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012). 
 130.  Id. at 2584; see also infra Part III.A.  
 131.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 132.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591, 2593; see also infra Part III.B. 
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quirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not ob-
taining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax and 
thus the individual mandate was within Congress’s taxing powers.133  
Fourth, the Court held that the Medicaid expansion provision of the 
ACA that penalized non-participating states by taking away their exist-
ing funding exceeded Congress’s power granted by the Spending 
Clause.134  Lastly, the Court held that the Medicaid expansion penalty 
was severable from the ACA, and left the rest of the provisions in-
tact.135 
A.  The Anti-Injunction Act 
The Court examined whether the penalty for not complying with 
the ACA’s individual mandate could be treated like a tax.136  If so, the 
Anti-Injunction Act would bar the suit because the penalty had not 
been paid.137  Focusing on the distinction between a “tax” and a “pen-
alty,” the Court reasoned that while Congress cannot change whether 
something is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes, the statu-
tory text could establish whether something is a tax or penalty under 
the Anti-Injunction Act.138  The Court held that because Congress 
chose to label the shared responsibility payment as a penalty, there 
was no reason to think that the Anti-Injunction Act, which is a statute 
applying to any “tax,” would apply to a “penalty.”139  Thus the Anti-
Injunction Act did not bar the Court from hearing the other chal-
lenges raised.140 
                                                        
 133.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600; see also infra Part III.C. 
 134.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2606; see also infra Part III.D.   
 135.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2608.   
 136.  Id. at 2593.   
 137.  Id. at 2582.  The Anti-Injunction Act provides that “no suit for the purpose of re-
straining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any 
person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such a tax was assessed.”  
I.R.C. § 7421(a) (West 2013). 
 138.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2583.  The Court reasoned that, because the 
Anti-Injunction Act and the ACA are “creatures of Congress’s own creation,” the relation 
between the statutes is best demonstrated by Congress’s statutory text, which refers to the 
payment as a penalty, not a tax.  Id.  
 139.  Id.  The Court looked to congressional intent to determine whether the penalty 
could be considered a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act.  Id.  The Court held that by 
clearly making a distinction between “tax” and “penalty” in the ACA, it followed that Con-
gress did not intend for the penalty to be a tax under the Anti-Injunction Act.  Id.  
 140.  Id. at 2584.   
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B.  The Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
The Court examined past Commerce Clause decisions to deter-
mine whether Congress had the power to enact the individual man-
date.141  The Court noted that Congress’s authority under the Com-
merce Clause is broad and extends beyond the direct regulation of 
interstate commerce to activities that have a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce, and activities that, when aggregated with similar 
activities of others, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.142  
The Court reasoned, however, that the power to regulate commerce 
“presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.”143  
The Court concluded that the individual mandate did not regulate 
existing commercial activity.144  Rather, it compelled individuals to be-
come active in commerce, which fell outside of the scope of Con-
gress’s powers under the Commerce Clause.145  The Court also noted 
that, although Congress can anticipate the effects of an already occur-
ring economic activity on commerce, this did not mean that Congress 
has the power to justify regulations by anticipating the creation of the 
activity itself.146  Thus, the Court held that the individual mandate was 
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.147 
The dissenting Justices also reached the conclusion that the indi-
vidual mandate was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.148  
They distinguished between regulating the consumption of health 
care and the participation in the health insurance market.149  The dis-
                                                        
 141.  Id. at 2585–86. 
 142.  Id. at 2585–87 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118–19 (1941); Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942)).  
 143.  Id. at 2586 (“If the power to ‘regulate’ something included the power to create it, 
many of the provisions in the Constitution would be superfluous . . . .  [T]he language of 
the Constitution reflects the natural understanding that the power to regulate assumes 
there is already something to be regulated.”).   
 144.  Id. at 2587. 
 145.  Id.  The Court was concerned that if the individual mandate was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, the clause would be expanded in a way 
that would allow Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to the effects of inaction 
on commerce.  Id.  The Court noted that, in Wickard, the farmer “was at least actively en-
gaged in the production of wheat.”  Id. at 2588. 
 146.  Id. at 2590.   
 147.  Id. at 2591.   
 148.  Id. at 2646–47 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).  Although the 
dissenting Justices agreed with the majority that the individual mandate is not sustainable 
under the Commerce Clause, they dissented from the tax portion of the majority’s analysis 
and asserted that the entire ACA should be held unconstitutional.  Id. at 2642. 
 149.  Id. at 2648.  The dissent noted that everyone may be said to consume health care if 
the term is taken as broadly as purchasing a bottle of aspirin, but that the health care 
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senting Justices noted that defining a market by participants who will, 
at some point in their life, probably purchase goods or services cov-
ered by mandated insurance is unprecedented and would leave no 
limits on Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.150  Also, they 
asserted that the Commerce Clause, even when supplemented by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for Congress to 
regulate commerce by doing whatever will help achieve its ends.151  
The dissent concluded that the individual mandate was unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause.152 
In her opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice 
Ginsburg disagreed with the Court’s holding that the individual man-
date was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, stating that 
the majority construed the Clause too rigidly.153  Justice Ginsburg ap-
plied a two-part test to determine whether the statute was constitu-
tional.154  She reasoned that the uninsured, as a class, substantially af-
fect interstate commerce because everyone will inevitably participate 
in the market for health care at some point, and those people without 
insurance affect the price of health care and health insurance regard-
less of their current health status.155  Justice Ginsburg found that the 
individual mandate was reasonably connected to Congress’s goal of 
protecting the health care market from disruption by individuals who 
fail to purchase insurance.156  Thus, Justice Ginsburg asserted that the 
                                                        
“market” that is the object of the individual mandate consists primarily of goods and ser-
vices that young people generally do not purchase.  Id.  
 150.  Id.  The dissenting Justices echoed the reasoning of the majority opinion regard-
ing the distinction between activity and inactivity, noting that “[i]f this provision ‘regu-
lates’ anything, it is the failure to maintain minimum essential coverage.”  Id. at 2644.   
 151.  Id. at 2646.  
 152.  Id. at 2644. 
 153.  Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Gins-
burg argued that precedent has recognized Congress’s broad authority to set the nation’s 
course in the economic and social welfare realms, and regulations of commerce that do 
not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within that power.  Id.  Justice Ginsburg 
found that the majority’s reading of the Commerce Clause “harks back to the era in which 
the Court routinely thwarted Congress’s efforts to regulate the national economy in the 
interest of those who labor to sustain it.”  Id.  
 154.  Id. at 2616.  Justice Ginsburg asserted that the questions asked when appraising 
legislation are: (1) whether Congress had a “rational basis” for concluding that the regu-
lated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, and (2) whether there is a reasona-
ble connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.  Id.  Justice 
Ginsburg also considered that Congress has the power to regulate economic activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce, as well as local activities that, when viewed in the 
aggregate, have a substantial impact on interstate commerce.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 2617.  
 156.  Id. at 2617–18. 
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individual mandate was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under 
the Commerce Clause.157 
The Court also considered whether Congress had the power to 
enact the individual mandate under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.158  According to the Court, although Congress’s determination 
that a regulation is necessary is generally entitled to some deference, 
the Court must declare unconstitutional any laws that undermine the 
structure of government established by the Constitution.159  The Court 
noted that all previous cases upholding laws under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in ser-
vice to, a granted power, which the Court found to be lacking in this 
case.160  Thus, even if the individual mandate was “necessary” to the 
ACA, the Court held that it was not a “proper” means of effectua-
tion.161 
Justice Ginsburg dissented with this part of the opinion as well, 
asserting that the individual mandate could be upheld under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.162  Justice Ginsburg noted that, com-
bined with several other provisions, the individual mandate was a 
necessary component of the ACA.163  Additionally, she asserted that 
the individual mandate was proper legislation because it addressed 
the “very sort of interstate problem that made the commerce power 
                                                        
 157.  Id.  Justice Ginsburg also dissented from the majority’s finding that the individual 
mandate attempts to regulate “inactivity” and asserted that the decision to self-insure is an 
economic act in itself, which is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 
2624.  She also disagreed that the individual mandate compels purchase of an unwanted 
product, arguing that Congress is merely defining the terms on which individuals pay for 
an interstate good, which is a “quintessential economic regulation well within Congress’s 
domain.”  Id. at 2620.   
 158.  Id. at 2591 (majority opinion).  The Necessary and Proper Clause states that Con-
gress shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for car-
rying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.   
 159.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591–92.   
 160.  Id. (citing United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010); Sabri v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 600, 602, 605 (2004); Jinks v. Richland Cnty., 538 U.S. 456 (2003)).  Be-
cause the Court found that the individual mandate could not be sustained under the 
Commerce Clause, it reasoned that it would be a broad expansion of federal authority, 
and would allow Congress to reach beyond the limit of its authority, to authorize the indi-
vidual mandate under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Id. at 2592. 
 161.  Id.   
 162.  Id. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 163.  Id. at 2626.  Justice Ginsburg argued the individual mandate is a key component 
tied to the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions.  Id.  Without the individual 
mandate, Congress learned, the community rating and guaranteed-issue requirements 
would trigger an adverse selection death spiral in the health-insurance market.  Id.  Thus, 
she asserted that the individual mandate was a necessary part of the legislation.  Id. 
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essential in our federal system.”164  Justice Ginsburg concluded that, 
when viewed as a component of the entire ACA, the individual man-
date was constitutional under the Necessary and Proper Clause.165 
C.  Congress’s Taxing Power 
While holding that the individual mandate could not be sus-
tained under the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper 
Clause,166 the Court considered whether the individual mandate could 
be read as imposing a tax on individuals who do not purchase insur-
ance.167  The Court reasoned that, while labeling the shared responsi-
bility payment as a “penalty” was fatal to the application of the Anti-
Injunction Act, that label did not determine whether the payment 
may be viewed as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power.168  Rather 
than focusing on the precise language, the Court looked to the sub-
stance and application of whether the payment fell under Congress’s 
taxing power.169 
The Court applied a functional approach similar to the one used 
in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,170 which focused on three practical 
characteristics of a tax: (1) the degree of burden it imposes, (2) 
whether it is punitive, and (3) whether it is enforced by an agency re-
sponsible for punishing violations or collecting revenue.171  The Court 
found that the shared responsibility payment could be considered a 
tax because it would be far less than the price of insurance, there was 
not a punitive element of the statute, and the payment was collected 
by the IRS through the normal means of taxation to raise revenue.172  
The Court reasoned that, although the payment may be intended to 
                                                        
 164.  Id. at 2628.  Justice Ginsburg disagreed with Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion that 
the individual mandate undermines the structure of government established by the Con-
stitution, instead noting that acting directly upon individuals, without employing the states 
as intermediaries, is entirely consistent with the Constitution’s design.  Id. at 2627. 
 165.  Id. at 2625. 
 166.  See supra Part III.B. 
 167.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2593 (majority opinion).  The Court recog-
nized that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, 
then courts should adopt the meaning that does not violate it.  Id.  The government ar-
gued the individual mandate could be read as imposing a tax if it was not permissible un-
der the Commerce Clause.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at 2594. 
 169.  Id. at 2596.  
 170.  259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922).  This case examined the constitutional validity of the Child 
Labor Tax Law.  Id. at 34.  The Court noted the difficulty of differentiating between a tax 
and a penalty, and devised a test that focused on three characteristics of a tax: the degree 
of burden, its punitive nature, and the enforcement agency.  Id. at 36–38. 
 171.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96. 
 172.  Id. 
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affect individual conduct, it does not preclude it from being a valid 
exercise of the taxing power.173  Thus, the Court held that the indi-
vidual mandate was a valid action under Congress’s taxing power.174 
In the joint dissent, the Justices argued that the analysis should 
have stopped after the individual mandate was found unconstitutional 
under the Commerce Clause.175  The dissenting Justices argued that 
there is no reason to look to the taxing power, because the individual 
mandate involved a penalty, and a penalty cannot also be a tax for 
constitutional purposes.176  The dissent argued further that to say the 
individual mandate imposed a tax was not interpreting the statute; it 
was rewriting it.177  Thus, the dissent concluded that the individual 
mandate is unconstitutional.178 
D.  Medicaid Expansion Provisions 
The Court also examined the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the 
Medicaid expansion was a valid exercise of Congress’s authority under 
the Spending Clause.179  The Court disagreed with the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s conclusion and held that the Medicaid expansion provision vio-
lated the Constitution.180  The Court asserted that states did not have a 
genuine choice whether to accept the grants and the accompanying 
conditions offered by Congress.181  Recognizing that Spending Clause 
legislation cannot use financial inducements to exert power so that 
“pressure turns into compulsion,”182 the Court found that Congress 
                                                        
 173.  Id.  In distinguishing penalties from taxes, the Court explained, “if the concept of 
penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission.”  See id. 
(“Neither the Act nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to not buying 
health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to the IRS.” (citing United States v. Reor-
ganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996)).  
 174.  Id. at 2600. 
 175.  Id. at 2650 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).   
 176.  Id. at 2651.  The dissent argued that in all other cases penalties and taxes are mu-
tually exclusive.  Id.  Furthermore, the dissenting Justices noted that in evaluating the indi-
vidual mandate, the Court should have looked at whether Congress framed the individual 
mandate as a tax, not whether it could have done so.  Id.   
 177.  Id. at 2655.  
 178.  Id. at 2642. 
 179.  Id. at 2601 (majority opinion).  The Spending Clause vests Congress with the pow-
er “[t]o lay and collect Taxes . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare 
of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 180.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 181.  Id.  The Court noted that it has repeatedly characterized Spending Clause legisla-
tion as similar in nature to a contract and stated that the legitimacy of Congress’s exercise 
of the spending power rests on whether a state voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms 
of the grant conditions.  Id. at 2602.   
 182.  Id. at 2602 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).  
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had crossed the line to coercion by threatening to take away existing 
Medicaid funding if states refused to accept the new expansion condi-
tions.183  In finding the Medicaid expansion penalty unconstitutional, 
the Court declined to fix the line where persuasion becomes coer-
cion, stating that it is “enough for today that wherever that line may 
be, this statute is surely beyond it.”184 
The Court also examined whether the Medicaid expansion was 
permitted under the right to alter, amend, or repeal provisions, re-
served by Congress in the original statute.185  The Court found that 
the Medicaid expansion was more than a modification of the current 
program and thus fell beyond the rights reserved in the statute.186  
The Court characterized the Medicaid expansion as a “shift in kind, 
not merely degree.”187  It further asserted that the Medicaid expansion 
resembled the creation of a separate Medicaid program.188  The Court 
held that states could hardly anticipate that the right to alter or 
amend the Medicaid program might include such a drastic transfor-
mation.189  Thus, the Court found that the Medicaid expansion was 
not constitutional under the Spending Clause powers granted to 
Congress.190 
The dissenting opinion also found that the Medicaid expansion 
was unconstitutional.191  The dissent opined that Congress had plainly 
crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion be-
cause, although a state could turn down the expansion as a matter of 
law, it would be incredibly costly to the state and its residents to do 
so.192  The Justices asserted that Congress knew that no state could re-
                                                        
 183.  Id. at 2603.  A state that opts out of the ACA’s expansion would lose all of its Medi-
caid funding, which accounts for over twenty percent of the average state’s total budget.  
Id. at 2604.  States have developed intricate regimes to run their Medicaid programs, and 
the states argued that threatened loss of all funding for that program essentially leaves the 
states with no choice but to participate in Medicaid expansion.  Id. at 2604–05. 
 184.  Id. at 2606.  
 185.  Id. at 2605; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (“The right to alter, amend, or repeal 
any provision of this chapter is hereby reserved to the Congress.”). 
 186.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06.   
 187.  Id.  The Court noted that the Medicaid expansion surprised states with post-
acceptance conditions, which is not permissible under the Spending Clause.  Id. at 2606. 
 188.  Id.  The Court asserted it was a separate program and shift in kind because the 
provisions expanded the initial categories of the needy who were covered under Medicaid 
to include all non-elderly with an income below 133 percent of the federal poverty level.  
Id.  
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 192.  Id. at 2662.  The dissent noted that, even if states refuse the expansion, their resi-
dents would still have to pay federal taxes to support the new program and would have to 
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fuse the Medicaid expansion, and thus the provision was unduly coer-
cive and exceeded Congress’s spending power.193 
In the dissenting portion of her opinion, Justice Ginsburg agreed 
with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that the Medicaid expansion pro-
visions were within Congress’s spending power.194  Justice Ginsburg 
noted that Congress could have recalled the existing Medicaid legisla-
tion and attempted to replace it, but it instead chose to exercise its 
right to “alter, amend, or repeal” any provision of the Medicaid Act.195  
Justice Ginsburg asserted that (1) Medicaid has always been a single 
program with a constant aim; (2) states have always had to comply 
with Congress’s conditions to receive the funding; and (3) past ex-
pansion of the program demonstrated adequate notice that Congress 
is entitled to amend the requirements of participation.196  She disa-
greed that the Medicaid expansion was a “shift in kind,” arguing that 
it was within the constitutional power granted to Congress to amend 
the program.197 
Justice Ginsburg also disagreed that the Medicaid expansion 
penalty was coercive.198  The Justice noted that while Congress might 
be prohibited from offering a financial inducement where “pressure 
turns into compulsion,” the Court has never before ruled that terms 
of a grant crossed that line.199  Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg ex-
pressed concern over the majority’s lack of guidance on fixing a line 
where “persuasion gives way to coercion.”200  Justice Ginsburg claimed 
that the majority’s “coercion inquiry . . . involve[d] political judg-
ments that defy judicial calculation” and were too amorphous to be 
judicially administrable.201  Justice Ginsburg would have held the Med-
                                                        
pay the equivalent in state taxes.  Id.  The dissent also noted that states rely upon Medicaid 
funding and that many states would be “hard pressed” to compensate for the loss of feder-
al funds if they chose not to participate in the expansion.  Id. at 2663.   
 193.  Id. at 2666. 
 194.  Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 195.  Id. at 2629–30.  Justice Ginsburg added that, since the enactment of the Medicaid 
Act in 1965, states have regularly conformed to the alterations made to it by Congress.  Id. 
at 2630.   
 196.  Id.   
 197.  Id.  Justice Ginsburg noted that, since 1965, Congress has amended the Medicaid 
program on more than fifty occasions, including expanding the beneficiaries.  Id. at 2631.  
She further asserted that “[e]nlargement of the population and services covered by Medi-
caid, in short, has been the trend.”  Id.   
 198.  Id. at 2642.  
 199.  Id. at 2634.  
 200.  Id. at 2640.  
 201.  Id. at 2641. 
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icaid expansion penalty to be a valid exercise of Congress’s power un-
der the Spending Clause.202 
E.  Severability of the Medicaid Penalty 
After determining that the ACA’s expansion of Medicare ex-
ceeded Congress’s power under the Spending Clause,203 the Court ex-
amined whether the unconstitutional portion of the Medicaid provi-
sions affected other parts of the ACA.204  The Court held that 
removing the provision that allows all further Medicaid payments to a 
state to be withheld would remedy the constitutional violation, and 
the severability clause included in the ACA permitted the rest of the 
Medicaid provisions to stand.205  Determining that Congress would 
have wanted to preserve the rest of the ACA, the Court allowed the 
remainder of the ACA to stand.206 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In National Federation, the Supreme Court held that the Medicaid 
expansion was unconstitutional under the Spending Clause powers 
granted to Congress.207  The Supreme Court concluded that Congress 
crossed the line to coercion by taking away existing Medicaid funding 
                                                        
 202.  Id. at 2642.   
 203.  See supra Part III.D.  The Court, however, also reasoned that, while Congress can-
not penalize states that choose not to participate in the Medicaid expansion by taking away 
existing funding, Congress still has the power to offer new funds under the ACA to expand 
Medicaid and to require separate compliance with conditions for their use.  Nat’l Fed’n of 
Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (majority opinion). 
 204.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2607.  In examining whether other provisions 
were affected, the Court relied on legislative intent, noting that unless it is “evident” that 
Congress would not have wanted the rest of the ACA to stand, it must be left intact.  Id.  
(citing Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). 
 205.  Id. at 2607.  The Court found that the severability clause demonstrated Congress’s 
explicit instructions to leave unaffected the remainder of the chapter if any particular pro-
vision was found invalid.  Id.  
 206.  Id. at 2608.  The dissent asserted that no part of the ACA is severable and thus the 
statute should be invalidated in its entirety; the dissenting Justices reasoned that making 
the Medicaid expansion voluntary introduced a new dynamic that should only be created 
by congressional choice, not the Court.  Id. at 2667 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., 
dissenting).  The dissent stated that without the individual mandate and Medicaid expan-
sion, the other provisions might impose enormous risks or unexpected burdens on the 
health-care community and federal budget, which would be in conflict with the ACA’s de-
sign of “shared responsibility.”  Id. at 2671.  The dissenting Justices concluded that the 
other provisions of the ACA could not remain if the individual mandate and Medicaid ex-
pansion are unconstitutional, because the other provisions cannot operate as Congress 
intended without those two major components.  Id. 
 207.  See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
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if states refused to accept the new expansion conditions.208  The Su-
preme Court erred in ruling that the Medicaid expansion penalty was 
not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Spending 
Clause.209  By applying an amorphous standard to determine that the 
Medicaid expansion provisions amounted to coercion, the Court left 
little guidance for evaluating future exercises of Spending Clause 
power to administer federal grant programs.210  The Court should 
have found that the states had a real choice to participate in the Med-
icaid expansion, and where states have a real choice there can be no 
coercion.211 
A.  The Application of the Supreme Court’s Amorphous Coercion Theory 
Identified What Is Not Coercion but Left No Indication of What 
Circumstances Amount to Coercion. 
The Spending Clause powers and the standards used to evaluate 
the use of those powers are well developed in the Court’s jurispru-
dence.212  Traditionally, great deference was given to Congress’s im-
plementation of federal grant programs through the spending pow-
er.213  While suits have been brought against federal grant programs 
invoking the coercion theory, and there have been changes to those 
programs, the application of the coercion theory by courts has been 
rather limited, with no established guidelines or standards for its im-
plementation.214 
                                                        
 208.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (majority opinion).   
 209.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 210.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 211.  See infra Part V.  
 212.  See supra note 36 and accompanying text; Part II.A.2. 
 213.  Gregory D. Hanley, Note, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Use of Condition-
al Funding Grants in Light of South Dakota v. Dole, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1643, 1649 (1988) 
(“[T]he Court has shown great deference to congressional acts, choosing to let Congress 
spend as it pleases. . . . Further, although the Court has acknowledged that at some point 
the coercion employed by a conditional grant can rob the states of free choice, the Court 
has not yet defined that point.”).  
 214.  See Coulter M. Bump, Comment, Reviving the Coercion Test: A Proposal to Prevent Fed-
eral Conditional Spending that Leaves Children Behind, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 536 (2005) 
(“[C]ourts commonly refused to engage in a coercion analysis given the elusiveness of the 
test and the failure of the plaintiff to give a ‘principled definition’ of the coercion con-
cept.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 102–103 
(2001) (“To begin with, it is impossible to draw a line between inducement and compul-
sion. . . .  Defining a distinction between inducement and coercion is even more difficult.  
What type of evidence would be relevant?”); Hanley, supra note 213, at 1649 (“This lack of 
legitimate, well-defined restrictions on the spending power was a formidable obstacle to 
South Dakota’s challenge of the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment in Dole.”).  
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The application of the coercion theory has led to several differ-
ent approaches, none of which led to the invalidation of a federal 
spending program.215  Thus, precedent does more to establish what 
does not amount to coercion than what does amount to coercion.  The 
guiding notions that emerged from the Supreme Court prior to Na-
tional Federation are that “to hold that motive or temptation is equiva-
lent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties,”216 and that 
withholding five percent of federal highway funding does not amount 
to coercion.217  In both instances, the Supreme Court declined to pro-
vide a fixed line at which inducement becomes coercion.218  This lack 
of guidance led to further limited application of the coercion theory 
in the lower courts, and a continued deference to Congress. 
Federal appellate courts have acknowledged the coercion theory 
but continued to uphold federal spending programs in instances 
where large amounts of funding were at stake.219  The Eighth Circuit 
rejected the coercion theory even where the entire amount of federal 
education funding was at risk.220  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit rejected 
the coercion theory when a state’s entire Medicaid funding was po-
tentially at risk.221  In Skinner, the Ninth Circuit upheld a federal 
spending program where almost all of Nevada’s federal highway fund-
ing would be withheld if the state refused to participate in the pro-
gram.222  Thus, these cases demonstrate that even where large 
amounts of funding are at stake, courts continued to defer to Con-
gress’s use of the spending power to enact federal spending programs 
in light of the doctrine’s lack of any clear boundaries.  Federal spend-
ing programs that threatened a state’s entire education budget or, 
similar to National Federation, threatened a state’s entire Medicaid 
budget have never been considered coercive.223  The historical appli-
cation of the coercion theory left little guidance regarding the factors 
                                                        
 215.  See supra Part II.B. 
 216.  See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 217.  See supra text accompanying note 69. 
 218.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
 219.  See supra Part II.B.3.  
 220.  Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 108–113. 
 221.  West Virginia v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 297 (4th Cir. 
2002); see also supra text accompanying notes 115–122.  
 222.  Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 454 (9th Cir. 1989); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 90–97. 
 223.  HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON 
THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/ 
upload/8347.pdf.  “In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Court for the first time found that a federal 
condition on a grant to states was unconstitutionally coercive.”  Id. 
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that might cause a federal spending program to be coercive, particu-
larly given that no line was drawn regarding percentage of funding at 
risk, and even programs that threatened 100% of funding have been 
upheld.224 
B.  In National Federation, the Supreme Court Applied a New Criterion 
to Evaluate Coercion and for the First Time Found that the Amount of 
Funding at Stake Made a Program Coercive, While Still Failing to Set 
Guidelines for Similar Analyses in the Future 
The Supreme Court, in National Federation, focused its coercion 
analysis on several factors,225 including the amount of funding at 
stake.  The Court also examined a new factor never previously consid-
ered.226  The Court found that the expansion of Medicaid crossed the 
line to coercion because the expansion was so broad that it actually 
created a different program, and that such a change was unforeseea-
ble when the states originally signed up to participate in Medicaid.227  
Although the amount of funding at stake and the changes being 
made to the Medicaid program played a role in the Court’s decision, 
the Court failed to identify the specific factors it considered funda-
mental in evaluating the coercion theory, and the opinion did not 
explain what factors needed to be met. 
1.  “A Shift in Kind, Not Merely Degree”: Why the Creation of a 
Separate Program That Threatens Funding of a Previous Program 
Is an Unworkable Factor in Future Coercion Theory Analyses 
In National Federation, the Supreme Court found that the ACA did 
not simply expand the Medicaid program but instead created a new 
program altogether.228  Thus, a possible new criterion for coercion 
emerged: A federal spending program may be coercive if it threatens 
to withhold funding from a separate program for refusal to partici-
                                                        
 224.  See supra text accompanying notes 73–75. 
 225.  See supra Part III.D. 
 226.  See Memorandum from the Congressional Research Service, Kathleen S. Swend-
iman and Evelyne P. Baumrucker, Selected Issues Related to the Effect of NFIB v. Sebelius 
on the Medicaid Expansion Requirements in Section 2001 of the Affordable Care Act (July 
16, 2012), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/aca_medicaid_expansion_ 
memo_1.pdf (stating that “[t]he fractured nature of this decision, with its three opinions, 
adds to the complexity of determining its effect on future grant conditions, and on im-
plementation of the ACA Medicaid Expansion”).  
 227.  See supra text accompanying notes 187–189. 
 228.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605–06 (2012).   
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pate in the new program.229  The majority reasoned that the Medicaid 
expansion was in actuality a new program because it transformed the 
old program to meet the health care needs of a different portion of 
the population.230  In practice, this provides no guidance for drawing 
the line between old and new programs, and was not a strongly sup-
ported interpretation of the Medicaid expansion.231  Medicaid was de-
veloped with the intent of enabling poor persons to receive basic 
health care when they need it.232  It is difficult to argue how expand-
ing the poor population served by Medicaid constitutes transforming 
the program.  Medicaid has gone through many expansions since its 
enactment, none of which have been questioned as being outside of 
the bounds of Congress’s right to repeal, amend, or alter the pro-
gram.233  Prior to this decision, the creation of a separate program had 
                                                        
 229.  See KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42367, THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL GRANT CONDITIONS AFTER NATIONAL FEDERATION OF 
INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS 14–15 (2012), available at http://theincidentaleconomist. 
com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CRS-Federal-Grants-R42367-clean.pdf 
(discussing the creation of criteria where, if a grant condition is attached to a new and in-
dependent program, the condition may be unconstitutionally coercive if it threatens fund-
ing of an existing program).  
 230.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 at 2605–06.  The Supreme Court stated that past 
amendments to the Medicaid program have simply altered and expanded boundaries of 
previously established categories.  Id. at 2606.  Justice Ginsburg pointed out, however, that 
when Medicaid was enacted, there were four categories of beneficiaries, and three more 
were added in late 1980s.  Id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  The Medicaid expansion simply adds another category.  Additionally, Medicaid is a 
program enacted to provide medical assistance to “needy persons,” so the additional cate-
gory of individuals under 133 percent of the federal poverty level should still qualify as 
meeting the purpose of the original Medicaid program.  Id. 
 231.  See Charlton C. Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid Ex-
pansion, Coercion, and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91, 165 (2012) (noting 
“the Chief Justice’s failure to provide a framework for analyzing when an amendment to a 
statute constitutes an entirely new statute”).  Only Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan agreed 
with the Chief Justice’s old program-new program analysis.  Swendiman & Baumrucker, 
supra note 226, at 2; see also John K. DiMugno, Navigating Health Care Reform: The Supreme 
Court’s Ruling and the Choppy Waters Ahead, 24 CAL. INS. L. & REG. REP. 1, 9 (2012) (“The 
coercion argument, however, succeeded in the Supreme Court based on the legal fiction 
that Medicaid is two federal programs.”).  
 232.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
 233.   See John D. Blum & Gayland O. Hethcoat II, Medicaid Governance in the Wake of Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: Finding Federalism’s Middle Pathway, 
from Administrative Law to State Compacts, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 601, 610–11 (2012) (dis-
cussing how Medicaid has been characterized by ongoing and regular changes in structure 
and benefits and noting that “[n]ot only have Medicaid benefits been markedly expanded 
over time, but noticeable changes in the nature and structure of care have occurred, and 
continue to occur”); Copeland, supra note 231, at 137 (arguing that the ACA requirement 
that states expand Medicaid is only the latest in a line of expansions of the program since 
its enactment); DiMugno, supra note 231, at 3 (“Over the years, Congress has amended the 
Medicaid program on more than 50 occasions, adding millions to the Medicaid eligible 
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never been a factor in coercion analyses, and the Court failed to pro-
vide specific guidelines for how to determine if an old program is be-
ing changed into a new program.  If expanding a program to reach a 
larger population constitutes the creation of a new program, future 
federal spending programs are likely to be constrained in making any 
changes to the way programs operate.  Without guiding principles, 
the old program-new program distinction creates another unclear cri-
teria for coercion theory application in future cases.234 
The vague old program-new program analysis could have unin-
tended consequences for the future of federal spending programs 
and Congress’s spending powers.235  It is unclear if the driving factor 
in creating a new program is the amount of money at stake236 or the 
changes made to the structure of the program.237  In National Federa-
tion, the Court did not establish a specific level of funding or particu-
lar program parameters that would amount to coercion.238  If expand-
                                                        
population.”); Sara Rosenbaum, The States’ Medicaid ‘Coercion’ Claim: More Rhetoric Than 
Fact, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 14, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2011/12/14/the-
states-medicaid-coercion-claim-more-rhetoric-than-fact/ [hereinafter States’ Medicaid ‘Coer-
cion’ Claim] (discussing how Medicaid has been transformed overtime, from four million 
covered in 1966 to nearly seventy million covered in 2010 as the result of mandates that 
states had to comply with to continue to receive federal funding).  The most significant 
expansions required states to extend eligibility to pregnant women and their children, if 
they qualified for welfare payments, and expand eligibility to elderly and the disabled who 
were not eligible for Supplemental Security Income.  Copeland, supra note 231, at 137.  
Other expansions involved increasing the income limits for eligible pregnant women and 
children.  Id.  
 234.  Swendiman & Baumrucker, supra note 226, at 4–5; see also id. at 3 (“While Justice 
Roberts’ opinion is technically the majority opinion only with regard to the Court’s reme-
dy, his views are likely to guide the lower courts in the future for new spending power chal-
lenges to federal grant conditions.”).  
 235.  See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 231, at 91 (noting that the Medicaid decision has 
the potential to impact federal-state cooperative arrangements such as No Child Left Be-
hind and others far beyond the health care context); DiMugno, supra note 231, at 10 (ar-
guing that holding the Medicaid expansion invalid could have profound implications for 
the validity of many federal programs because the Court provided little guidance on how 
to determine whether federal spending conditions are coercive); Nicole Huberfeld, Post-
Reform Medicaid Before the Court: Discordant Advocacy Reflects Conflicting Attitudes, 21 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 513, 538 (2002) (discussing how a decision that expands the coercion theory 
would be far reaching because so many major public programs rely on conditional spend-
ing laws). 
 236.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (“In this case, the financial ‘induce-
ment’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a 
gun to the head.”).  
 237.  See id. at 2605 (noting that the Medicaid expansion was a “shift in kind, not merely 
degree” and created a new program, rather than expanding the old one).  
 238.  See Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Is Medicaid Constitutional?, N. ENGL. J. MED., May 3, 2012, 
at e27(2), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1204347 (“Most co-
operative federal programs—addressing not only health care but also transportation, edu-
cation, welfare, community development, and environmental problems—involve condi-
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ing the population that a federal spending program reaches, or ad-
justing the amount of funding attached to a program or required of a 
state qualifies it as new program, future federal grant programs may 
have a difficult time exercising their right to amend the program 
without exposing themselves to a coercion challenge.239  Thus the old 
program-new program criterion introduced by the Court in National 
Federation is unlikely to act as a workable standard in evaluating coer-
cion, and may cause great uncertainty for federal spending programs 
in the future.240 
2.  Why It is Never Clear When Financial Inducement Crosses the 
Line Between “Mild Encouragement” and a “Gun to the Head” 
In National Federation, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
amount of funding at stake for the states.241  As a result, for the first 
time ever, the Court found that an exercise of Congress’s spending 
power was unconstitutionally coercive.242  Chief Justice Roberts noted 
that, in this case, “the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is 
much more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the 
head.”243  At the same time, the Supreme Court still declined to speci-
fy the point at which the financial inducement became coercion.244  
Emphasizing the impact of funding on the coercion analysis but not 
fixing a specific line or providing some guidance as to where the line 
                                                        
tional federal grants to the states.  All these programs are subject to litigation if the states 
win this case.”). 
 239.  See id. at e27(2)–(3) (“The Court’s establishing the coercion theory as an active 
legal doctrine would threaten the ability of the federal government to work with the states 
to address national problems.  Holding the expansion unconstitutional could eliminate 
federal–state cooperative programs.  The ramifications of such a ruling could far exceed 
those that might follow from the invalidation of the minimum-coverage requirement.”).  
 240.  See Lyle Denniston, Argument Recap: Will Medicaid be Sacrificed?, SCOTUS BLOG 
(Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/argument-recap-will-medicaid-be-
sacrificed/ (noting a comment from Justice Sotomayor at oral arguments that “[w]e’re 
going to tie the hands of the federal government in choosing how to structure a coopera-
tive relationship with the states.  We’re going to say to the federal government, the bigger 
the problem, the less your powers are.”). 
 241.  Medicaid spending accounts for over twenty percent of the average state’s total 
budget, with federal funds covering fifty to eighty-three percent of those costs.  Nat’l Fed’n 
of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604.  The Court noted that “the threatened loss of over 10 per-
cent of a State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no 
real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”  Id. at 2605. 
 242.  Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 243.  Id. at 2604 (majority opinion). 
 244.  Id. at 2606.  The Court noted that Steward Machine Co. did not attempt to fix an 
outermost line where persuasion gives way to coercion, and this Court also had no need to 
fix a line: “It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is surely be-
yond it.”  Id.  
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could be found, perpetuates the use of an amorphous funding con-
sideration in future cases dealing with coercion.245  The lack of a fixed 
line leaves the funding factor open to interpretation.  In Justice Gins-
burg’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, she notes: 
 When future Spending Clause challenges arrive, as they 
likely will in the wake of today’s decision, how will litigants 
and judges assess whether “a State has a legitimate choice 
whether to accept the federal conditions in exchange for 
federal funds”?  Are courts to measure the number of dollars 
the Federal Government might withhold for noncompli-
ance?  The portion of the State’s budget at stake?  And 
which State’s—or States’—budget is determinative[?]246 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion has merit.  Thus far, when it comes to 
programs that withhold federal funds, the Supreme Court has spoken 
to what constitutes coercion at opposite ends of the spectrum, but it 
has not clearly addressed what would happened in between.  In Dole, 
for example, the Court held that withholding five percent of federal 
highway funds was not coercive.247  In National Federation, however, the 
Court ruled that withholding 100 percent of Medicaid funds was co-
ercive.248  But what happens when a federal spending program at-
tempts to withhold some amount of funding between five percent and 
100 percent?  The variety of ways funding could be taken into account 
create more questions than answers for the future application of the 
coercion theory.249 
Another factor complicating the use of funding to evaluate coer-
cion is that the impact of funding inducements may vary across differ-
ent states.250  Because different states have different needs, some 
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might feel coerced, while others might not.  At oral argument in Na-
tional Federation, Justice Ginsburg observed that, while twenty-six states 
claimed that the Medicaid expansion was coercive, there were other 
states that liked the expansion, and did not feel coerced.251  Several 
states opted to begin expanding Medicaid after the ACA was signed 
into law, without regard for the potential lawsuits.252  Gillian Metzger, 
a professor at Columbia Law School, noted that “for some states that 
have already expanded their Medicaid programs . . . this expansion 
with the funding that came along with it was hardly coercive at all.  It 
was actually quite supportive of their choices.”253  Whether a funding 
program is seen as inducement or coercion may also depend on the 
political choices of a state and its budget.254  The individualized nature 
of state decisions makes it difficult to assess from the federal perspec-
tive whether conditional funds are coercive across the board, further 
complicating the use of funding at stake to assess coercion. 
The individualized nature of determining coercion and the lack 
of specified limits emphasize the fact that a funding-focused analysis is 
not a workable standard for evaluating coercion.255  Precedent has 
shown that given the lack of a fixed line where the amount of funding 
becomes coercive, courts have interpreted the importance of funding 
at stake differently.256  Using funding to evaluate coercion attempts to 
distinguish situations where withholding funding coerces rather than 
induces.257  The difference between the two is difficult to establish, 
and courts have discarded the dichotomy in other areas of constitu-
tional adjudication because there is no way to distinguish between the 
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two in a practical way.258  It is unclear how future courts will interpret 
the decision in National Federation and how it may impact the future of 
federal spending programs.  Thus, the amount of funding involved in 
a federal spending program should not be a factor used to evaluate 
the presence of coercion. 
C.  Using the Presence of a Choice to Evaluate Coercion Claims: Why a 
Bright-Line Test Is Unworkable 
No clear framework has been presented for evaluating the pres-
ence of coercion in future cases.259  In actuality, it would be very diffi-
cult to come up with a judicially manageable standard to apply to co-
ercion claims.260  A bright-line test may place excessive limits on the 
ability of Congress to create and develop federal programs with con-
ditional funding, and is likely to suffer the inadequacies inherent to 
bright-line rules—either arbitrarily categorizing cases on the basis of 
some proposed mathematical limit or providing a vague verbal classi-
fication of cases that provides little more guidance than a broad term 
such as coercion.261  The inadequacy of a bright-line test requires that 
the Court re-examine the meaning of the coercion theory and the cri-
teria used to evaluate it.262 
1.  The Role of State Autonomy and Why There Is Still a Choice 
Regardless of the Amount of Funding at Stake 
In Steward Machine Co., the Court recognized that Congress 
should not be able to destroy or impair the autonomy of the states.263  
Thus, the coercion theory was initially developed as a safeguard to en-
sure that states have the ability to make a choice in accepting or re-
jecting federal funding.264  Although the fiscal impact of conditional 
funding may affect a state’s decision to participate in a federal pro-
gram, it does not prevent a state from choosing.265  States possess the 
power to raise money by taxation or other methods; thus a federal 
program does not become coercive by offering needed funds.266  Low-
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er federal courts have largely recognized that the coercion theory re-
lates to the autonomy of states, not financial temptation, and accord-
ingly never used the coercion theory to limit the spending power.267  
Several courts have properly rejected coercion arguments because 
they doubted that states could be coerced into participating in federal 
spending programs.268  Rather, courts have consistently recognized 
the difference between coercion and difficult choices.269  While finan-
cial inducement has been considered in cases evaluating a coercion 
claim, until National Federation, it had never been a determining fac-
tor, because the focus rightfully rested on the presence of a choice—
not the level of funding involved. 
A choice-focused inquiry provides the proper analytical frame-
work.  The factors for evaluating whether there is a choice were estab-
lished by the Court in Dole.270  Under the Dole analysis, a state choice 
requires notice and clear understanding of the conditions by the 
state.271  Conditional grants by their nature present states with the 
choice to comply with the conditions, and thus a conditional grant 
cannot force a state’s choice under the coercion theory.272  As long as 
the state possesses the ultimate authority to accept or reject federal 
funds along with their associated conditions, there is no interference 
with the ability of a state to make that choice.273  Drawing a fixed line 
between encouragement and inducement has proven impossible, and 
using a coercion theory to attempt to do that obscures the difference 
between choice and compulsion.274  While states “may have to make a 
hard decision in foregoing federal funds and ultimately may not want 
to do so . . . that is different from compulsion where truly no choice 
remains.”275  Thus, even in the face of a difficult choice, states retain 
the ability to exercise their autonomy in making a choice, and where 
a real choice is present there cannot be coercion. 
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2.  States Can Choose Whether or Not to Participate in Medicaid, and 
Where There Is a Choice, There Cannot Be Coercion 
States have always had a choice of whether to participate in Med-
icaid.  Medicaid is a voluntary program and, while “Congress histori-
cally has reserved the right to alter and amend the program as need-
ed. . . .  [S]tates historically have reserved the right either not to 
participate at all, and to exit the program whenever they so desire.”276  
Prior to the decision in National Federation, lower federal courts were 
in agreement that participation in Medicaid is entirely voluntary and 
therefore could not qualify as coercion.277  In facing the choice of 
whether to participate in the Medicaid expansion, the States were giv-
en notice and a clear understanding of the conditions.278  From its en-
actment, the Medicaid statute has contained a provision that reads 
“The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of this chapter is 
hereby reserved to the Congress.”279  When states initially agreed to 
participate in Medicaid, they accepted those terms and, since then, 
have accepted the numerous changes made to the program.280  The 
states retain the choice of whether to participate in Medicaid and ac-
cept that Congress has the right to make changes to the program: 
A state still can walk away from Medicaid . . . .  Were this to 
happen, both the state and Congress would face the very 
hard choice about what to do for millions of residents whose 
incomes are too low to qualify for a premium tax credit.  But 
this hard choice does not amount to legal compulsion.281 
In addition to understanding the terms of the Medicaid pro-
gram, states were given four years from when the ACA was passed to 
decide whether or not to participate in the Medicaid expansion.282  
The nature of Medicaid as a voluntary program that was familiar to 
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the states, coupled with the four-year period the states had to make 
their decisions about participation, demonstrates that the necessary 
elements to make a choice were present, and thus the Court should 
not have found coercion. 
The financial inducement for the Medicaid expansion may be 
significant, but it did not eliminate the ability of any state to make a 
choice about its participation in the program.  When introduced by 
Steward Machine Co., the coercion theory was premised on the ability 
of states to retain their autonomy.283  While courts have acknowledged 
that the amount of funding at stake could play a role in limiting Con-
gress’s spending powers, no court prior to National Federation ever 
found that the amount of funding at stake amounted to coercion.  
Funding may influence a state’s decision, but the choice to accept or 
decline conditions and the attached federal funding still belongs to 
the state.  Without the elimination of a state’s ability to make a choice, 
there can be no coercion.  Under the ACA, the states retained the 
choice to forgo participation in Medicaid, and thus would not have 
been coerced into participating.284 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court held in National Federation that the Medicaid 
expansion penalty provision was unconstitutional, further complicat-
ing the application of an amorphous coercion theory.285  As a result, 
the future of federal funding programs may be called into question286 
because the Court failed to articulate parameters for evaluating the 
presence of coercion, leaving courts without clear guidelines for ex-
amining future coercion claims.287  The Court should not have con-
sidered the amount of federal funding at stake or the extent of the 
changes made to the program; instead, the Court should have fo-
cused on whether the states had a choice to participate in the Medi-
caid program.288  The Court should have found that the states had a 
real choice of whether to participate in the Medicaid expansion, and 
where states have a real choice there cannot be coercion.289 
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